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Several lines of evidence accrued over the last 5–10 years have converged to suggest
that the parafascicular nucleus of the thalamus and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
each represent or contribute to internal state/context representations that guide action
selection in partially observable task situations. In rodents, inactivations of each structure
have been found to selectively impair performance in paradigms testing goal-directed
action selection, but only when that action selection relies on state representations.
Electrophysiological evidence has suggested that each structure achieves this function
via inputs onto cholinergic interneurons (CINs) in the dorsomedial striatum. Here, we
briefly review these studies, then point to anatomical evidence regarding the afferents of
each structure and what they suggest about the specific features that each contribute
to internal state representations. Finally, we speculate as to whether this role might
be achieved interdependently through direct PF→OFC projections, or through the
convergence of independent direct orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and parafascicular nucleus
of the thalamus (PF) inputs onto striatal targets.
Keywords: state, context, goal-directed action, orbitofrontal cortex, parafascicular thalamic nucleus, cholinergic
interneurons, striatum
INTRODUCTION
To select the optimal action in many given situations, it has been posited that organisms must
mentally represent that situation (or ‘‘internal context,’’ ‘‘latent cause,’’ or ‘‘state;’’ Gershman et al.,
2010; Gershman and Niv, 2012) by integrating features of their internal environment with those
of the external environment. To draw upon an example we have given previously (Bradfield and
Hart, 2020), if you visit a particular restaurant often, upon visiting you might combine external
information about the sights/sounds/smells of the restaurant itself with internal knowledge that it is
Saturday and therefore pasta is the daily special, before making an order for pasta. This integrated
‘‘state’’ representation has been claimed to rely on both the parafascicular nucleus of the thalamus
(PF) and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), particularly when it requires unobservable features to be
inferred frommemory. How exactly each structure might achieve this function, however, has yet to
be considered.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2021 | Volume 15 | Article 655029
Stayte et al. Thalamo-Cortical Contributions to State Representation
The first suggestion that the PF of the rat might provide
information about internal state and/or context to ‘‘higher
centers’’ was made in Deschênes et al. (1996) based on the unique
morphology of the PF’s glutamatergic projection neurons, the
specific topographical arrangement of their outputs to basal
ganglia and cerebral cortex, and the rich variety of excitatory
and inhibitory afferents PF receives. These features, the authors
argued, meant that PF was well-placed to integrate multiple
and varied synaptic inputs, and combine them in a way that
addressed specific pools of neurons as one might expect of a
region combining multiple elements into a unified contextual
representation. Twenty-four years later, there have now been
several studies employing various techniques, manipulations,
and behavioral assays, that have converged to suggest that PF
does indeed provide some kind of internal state or context
representation (Brown et al., 2010; Bradfield et al., 2013a; Aoki
et al., 2015; Bradfield and Balleine, 2017). This information
is suspected to influence action selection via PF inputs onto
cholinergic interneurons (CINs) in the dorsomedial striatum,
which is thought to modulate local spiny projection neurons
(SPNs), which then co-ordinate to select actions following
the currently inferred internal state (Bradfield et al., 2013a;
Matamales et al., 2016; Apicella, 2017). Although it is beyond
the scope of the current review, recent evidence suggests
that how SPNs perform this action selection function is
via outputs to the substantia nigra reticulata (SNr), through
both the direct and indirect pathways. Most recently, it has
been suggested that although the direct pathway is always
involved in goal-directed action selection, the indirect pathway
outputs become particularly important for action selection when
unobservable information must be inferred (e.g., during a
reversal, Peak et al., 2020).
This role for PF appears to parallel that of the lateral
OFC in many ways, at least in rodents (Wilson et al., 2014;
Parkes et al., 2018; Bradfield and Hart, 2020). Moreover, the
modulation of action selection according to the internal state
by dorsomedial CINs has also separately been shown to rely
on inputs from lateral OFC (Stalnaker et al., 2016). In this
review article, we will explore how the PF and OFC might
function independently and/or possibly interdependently to
form cohesive representations of the internal state.
Inactivating the Parafascicular Thalamic
Nucleus or Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex
Impairs Goal-Directed Action Selection
That Relies on State Representations
Because we and others have extensively reviewed the studies of
behavioral consequences of PF and lateral OFC inactivations for
goal-directed action elsewhere (Bradfield et al., 2013b; Wilson
et al., 2014; Sharpe et al., 2019; Bradfield and Hart, 2020), for
present purposes we shall do so only briefly, to reveal their
commonalities. More specifically, we have limited our review
to studies that employed tasks in which animals could make a
goal-directed choice between two or more options that have been
studied with regards to both PF and lateral OFC. It is worth
noting, however, that numerous other studies (e.g., Brown et al.,
2010; Baltz et al., 2018; Malvaez et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2019)
indicate a role for either OFC or PF separately in representing
states with regards to other psychological phenomena such as
incentive learning and maze learning. It will be of some interest
to future studies to employ such tasks in the examination of
the alternate structure (i.e., if OFC was studied previously, to
study PF using the same task) to determine whether OFC and
PF function also appear consistent across those tasks.
The first common finding involving goal-directed choice is
that lesions of both PF and lateral OFC have been found to leave
instrumental outcome devaluation—the primary behavioral
assay used in the laboratory to assess goal-directed action—intact
(Ostlund and Balleine, 2007; Balleine et al., 2011; Bradfield et al.,
2013a; Bradfield and Balleine, 2017; but see Gremel and Costa,
2013). This suggests that goal-directed action per se does not
depend on the integrity of either PF or OFC. For the procedure
employed in each of these studies, rats were trained to press two
levers for two food outcomes (e.g., left-lever pellets, right lever-
sucrose, or the opposite arrangement, counterbalanced). Animals
were then tested for their ability to flexibly alter their responding
in a goal-directedmanner when one of the outcomes was reduced
in value as a result of it being fed to satiety (i.e., sensory-
specific satiety, Balleine and Dickinson, 1992) and animals were
subsequently allowed to choose which lever to press. All groups
in all of these studies, regardless of whether they had received
excitotoxic or sham lesions of PF or lateral OFC, selectively
responded on the lever on the test that had previously earned
the still-valued outcome. This intact performance suggested that
all animals were able to elicit actions motivated by both: (a) the
current value of the outcome; and (b) the contingency between
action and outcome, and thus fulfilled the two goal-directed
action criteria (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
Despite this result, there is evidence that another measure
of goal-directed action, contingency degradation, is impaired
by PF lesions in rats (Bradfield et al., 2013a), as well as by
the selective knockdown of brain-derived neurotrophic factor
(BDNF) used to reduce activity-dependent neuroplasticity in the
lateral OFC of mice (Zimmermann et al., 2017). For contingency
degradation, rats are typically once again trained to press the left
and the right lever for a pellet and a sucrose outcome, respectively
(counterbalanced). After several days of training, one of these
outcomes also begins to be delivered freely, in the absence of
lever press. This is done in a manner such that the probability
of receiving a pellet (if pellets are the degraded outcome) is
equivalent regardless of whether the animal presses the pellet
lever or not. This serves to degrade the contingency between
that specific lever and its outcome, which is evidenced when the
animal reduces its pressing on the pellet lever but continues to
press the sucrose lever.
As reviewed previously (Bradfield and Hart, 2020), successful
contingency degradation performance requires animals to reduce
interference between competing contingencies in a manner that
outcome devaluation does not. Specifically, whereas outcome
devaluation requires only that the animal learn only two
excitatory lever press-outcome associations (e.g., left lever-
pellets, right lever sucrose, represented in the left panel of
Figure 1), contingency degradation requires the animal to first
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FIGURE 1 | State-space representation for contingency degradation: during
the initial phase (left panel) the animal learns that action 1 (A1) earns outcome
1 (O1) and action 2 (A2) earns outcome 2 (O2). During degradation (right
panel), the animal learns that in addition to A1–O1 and A2–O2, taking any
“other action” (OA, anything other than pressing the levers, e.g., sitting,
sniffing, exploring, et cetera) also earns O1, which serves to degrade the
contingency between A1 and O1. It is posited that the animal partitions the
initial learning contingencies (A1–O1, A2–O2) and the degradation
contingencies (A1–O1, A2–O2, OA–O1) into two states, state 1 (S1) and state
2 (S2), respectively.
learn these same associations, but then to also learn a ‘‘no
lever press-pellet’’ association that competes with the left lever-
pellet association. We (Bradfield et al., 2013a,b) and others
(Schoenbaum et al., 2013) have speculated that in instances such
as these, the animal does not unlearn the initial contingency,
but rather retains it alongside the new (no lever press-pellet)
contingency, and uses internal context/state information to infer
whether pressing the pellet lever or abstaining from pressing
it is the optimal action to earn a pellet. That is, as shown in
Figure 1 and in a manner reminiscent of Yael Niv’s latent cause
theory (Gershman et al., 2010; Gershman and Niv, 2012); if
the animal infers the initial lever press acquisition state/latent
cause [state 1 (S1)] it will press the lever to earn a pellet, but
if it infers the degradation state/latent cause [state 2 (S2)] it
will withhold lever pressing to earn a pellet. Thus, the fact that
PF inactivation and lateral OFC inactivation/BDNF knockdown
impairs contingency degradation but not outcome devaluation is
consistent with a role for each in representing states, because only
degradation requires the partitioning of competing contingencies
into separate states.
A final behavioral assay that is impaired by inactivations
of both PF and lateral OFC is reversal learning. As reviewed
previously (Manning et al., 2020), the regulation of reversal
learning by lateral OFC has been demonstrated across many
varied paradigms, but for current purposes, we will describe the
only such paradigm that unambiguously recruits goal-directed
actions. In this procedure, rats were once again trained to press
two levers for two unique outcomes, but these contingencies
were later reversed. That is, if the left lever initially earned
pellets it was reversed to earn sucrose, and if the right
lever initially earned sucrose it was reversed to earn pellets.
Animals were again subject to an outcome devaluation test as
previously described, and intact animals uniformly responded
on the lever that earned the valued outcome following the
reversed contingencies. Animals that had experienced PF lesions
FIGURE 2 | State-space representation for outcome reversal: during the
initial phase (left panel) the animal learns that action 1 (A1) earns outcome 1
(O1) and action 2 (A2) earns outcome 2 (O2). During reversal (right panel), the
animal learns the reverse contingencies: A1–O2 and A2–O1. It is posited that
the animal partitions the initial learning contingencies (A1–O1, A2–O2) and the
reversed contingencies (A1–O2, A2–O1) into two states, state 1 (S1) and
state 2 (S2), respectively.
(Bradfield et al., 2013a) or chemogenetic inactivation of the
lateral OFC (Parkes et al., 2018), on the other hand, responded
on both levers equally, suggesting that the initially-learned lever
press contingencies were interfering with the performance of
the reversed contingencies. As shown in Figure 2, it has been
posited that animals partition the two sets of contingencies into
two internal state representations: State 1 (initial) and State 2
(reversal). Animals that cannot partition the states in this manner
would be expected to respond as per both sets of contingencies
and press the levers equally, as was observed for animals with
PF or lateral OFC inactivation. We have further explicitly
demonstrated that intact animals do concurrently retain both the
initial and the reversed contingencies in this paradigm (Bradfield
and Balleine, 2017), indicating that they must use internal state
information to determine with which set of contingencies to act
in accordance.
Parafascicular and Orbitofrontal Cortical
Efferents Onto Striatal Cholinergic
Interneurons
The behavioral studies reviewed above reveal some striking
parallels between the function of the PF and of the lateral
OFC in tasks for which goal-directed choices rely on
mental representations of states. Additional evidence from
electrophysiological, immunohistochemical, and behavioral
studies have further demonstrated that this function of PF/OFC
inputs manifests via inputs onto striatum, particularly (but not
exclusively) the cholinergic interneurons (CINs), which are
purported to use this information to modulate the local SPNs for
accurate action selection (Bradfield et al., 2013b; Stalnaker et al.,
2016; Bradfield and Balleine, 2017).
With regards to PF, we (Bradfield et al., 2013a) found that
asymmetric lesions of PF and posterior dorsomedial striatum
produce identical behavioral results to bilateral PF lesions:
leaving outcome devaluation intact but impairing contingency
degradation and outcome reversal learning. Interestingly,
asymmetric lesions of the PF and anterior dorsomedial striatum
did not affect behavior in any of our tasks, suggesting that this
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particular function is specific to the PF→posterior dorsomedial
striatal pathway. Further, we demonstrated that lesioning the
PF selectively reduced both the action potential frequency, as
well as the phosphorylation of ribosomal protein S6 (indicative
of reduced CIN activity) of CINs in the dorsomedial striatum,
whereas it appeared to increase SPN activity in the same
region, as evidenced by a significant increase in the number
of phospho-Thr202-Tyr204-ERK1/2 (pERK1/2)-labeled SPNs.
Thus, although PF does project directly onto SPNs as well as
CINs, this particular pattern of responding is most consistent
with SPN reactivity being modulated indirectly throughout this
task, via the loss of CIN modulation as a result of PF lesion,
because the direct loss of glutamatergic PF inputs onto SPNs
should have manifested as a decrease rather than an increase in
SPN activity. Matamales et al. (2016) later directly implicated
CINs in dorsomedial striatum in state inference when they
demonstrated that the selective toxigenic ablation of CINs in
this region also replicated the behavior observed after bilateral
PF lesions, leaving outcome devaluation intact but impairing
outcome reversal.
With regards to the lateral OFC, Stalnaker et al. (2016) first
recorded directly from putative dorsomedial striatal CINs in rats
whilst they performed a task in which different outcomes (vanilla
or chocolate milk) were earned in different amounts (one or
three drops) by different responses (left or right), depending
on which ‘‘block’’ was currently active (e.g., in block 1, a left
response may have earned three drops of vanilla milk and a
right response earned one drop of chocolate milk, et cetera).
Switches between blocks occurred in the absence of any change
in external stimuli such that rats needed to infer the block change
when responses earned different outcomes. Optimal choices
following block transition would be more likely if animals were
able to infer a new state, rather than overwriting their prior
learning about each action-outcome pairing. They found that the
activity of CINs was selective to particular blocks and that if this
activity appeared to miscode a block, the animal made poorer
choices. Moreover, the SPNs recorded in the same study were
significantly worse than the CINs at decoding block identity.
Finally, when the lateral OFC was lesioned in one hemisphere,
CINs in the ipsilateral dorsomedial striatum reduced block
decoding to chance level (and interestingly, enhanced decoding
of single events). Together, these results suggest that in intact
animals, CINs infer some kind of state representation that
enables the animal to identify the currently active block,
allowing them to make accurate choices accordingly, and they
further suggest that this function is dependent on inputs from
lateral OFC.
Together, these studies suggest that dorsomedial striatal
CINs infer state representations that are used to guide action
selection, and that this role for striatal CINs depends on inputs
from PF and lateral OFC. It is worth noting, however, that
this work is not definitive and almost certainly presents an
oversimplified characterization of the mechanisms that underlie
the psychological phenomenon of state representation. Indeed,
there are complexities both within the striatum (e.g., other
neurons/interneuron types), as well as PF and lateral OFC
circuitry with other brain regions, that are not captured here
that are likely to also contribute to state representation and its
influence over action selection.
Anatomical Evidence for Lateral
Orbitofrontal Cortical and/or
Parafascicular Representations of Internal
State
Caveats aside, it is clear from the studies outlined above
that PF, OFC, and dorsomedial striatal CINs work in concert
with each other (and possibly with other neuronal types/brain
regions) to achieve accurate state representation and subsequent
goal-directed action selection. What is not clear is how the PF
and lateral OFC might coordinate to achieve this function. For
instance, do PF and lateral OFC contribute similar or unique
information to the state representation? Do they achieve this
independently, interdependently, or both? Although it is not
possible to answer these questions with any certainty as there
have not been any direct studies of how PF-OFC circuitry
might relate to internal state representation, here we will provide
our speculative view based on the anatomical connections of
each structure. Although the characterization of this circuitry
presented here has been simplified for ease of communication
(see Figure 3), it is worth noting that both OFC (Reep et al., 1996;
Hoover and Vertes, 2011) and PF (Mandelbaum et al., 2019)
display heterogeneity that is often topographical with regards
to their projection patterns which likely underlie different
functions. Thus, the state representation functionmight only rely
on the very specific projections that were the focus of the studies
above i.e., lateral OFC→centrodorsomedial striatum (Stalnaker
et al., 2016; PF→posterior dorsomedial striatum Bradfield et al.,
2013a; Bradfield and Balleine, 2017). Nevertheless, there is some
suggestion that state representation as it could relate to non-
goal-directed, stimulus-dependent responding could rely on
adjacent but non-identical neuronal ensembles/pathways (e.g.,
PF (anterior dorsomedial striatum, dorsolateral CINs; Brown
et al., 2010; Aoki et al., 2015, 2018).
As has been noted elsewhere (Schuck et al., 2018; Bradfield
and Hart, 2020), the OFC is anatomically well-placed to
represent internal state because it receives sensory inputs
of multiple modalities, including from olfactory, gustatory,
visual, and somatic/sensory cortices. It also receives inputs
from regions involved in learning and memory such as the
hippocampus, and emotion such as the amygdala. The lateral
OFC is thus well-placed to integrate information about an
organism’s current circumstances from multiple sensory inputs
with learned information from memory about which actions
may have historically resulted in optimal outcomes in the
current environment, as well as emotional information about
the organism’s current desires. This is precisely the type of
information that is necessary to infer internal states for accurate
action selection in partially observable task situations.
As mentioned previously, the PF has also been noted for
being anatomically well-placed to receive and integrate several
disparate inputs in the way one might expect of a structure
encoding internal state or context information (Deschênes et al.,
1996). Similar to lateral OFC, the rat PF receives some sensory
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FIGURE 3 | Proposed simplified circuit of internal state representations: The lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) receives afferents conveying sensory information from
visual, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory cortices, spatial and memory information from the hippocampus, and emotional information from the amygdala, the
parafascicular nucleus of the thalamus (PF) receives sensory inputs from the gustatory cortex and somatosensory cortex, as well as action planning and execution,
arousal/attentional information from the lateral tegmental nucleus, zona incerta, primary reticular nucleus, entopeduncular nucleus, and the primary motor cortex.
Each structure performs independent integration of these inputs, and then either communicates directly via PF→lateral OFC→striatal cholinergic interneurons (CINs),
or by converging lateral OFC→striatal CINs/PF→striatal CINs projections to form a cohesive, single internal state representation. Striatal CINs then modulate the
striatal projection neurons (SPNs) to influence action selection according to the internal state.
inputs that could allow it to identify current circumstances,
such as inputs from the gustatory cortex and inputs from the
primary somatosensory cortex (Cornwall and Phillipson, 1988).
In contrast to lateral OFC, however, PF does not receive any
direct inputs (that we know of) from visual, auditory, or olfactory
cortices, hippocampus, or amygdala. In further contrast to
the lateral OFC, all other primary sources of inputs to PF
appear to play some role in motor function or arousal/attention.
Specifically, major inputs to PF include those from the
primarymotor cortex, primary reticular nucleus, entopeduncular
nucleus, zona incerta, and laterodorsal tegmental nucleus
(Cornwall and Phillipson, 1988), each of which plays some role in
planning and executing movements, and/or mediating attention
and arousal. Although we will not address it further here, the
mediation of attention, in particular, has also been persuasively
argued to be central to PF’s contextual regulation of dorsomedial
striatal CINs (see Apicella, 2017).
Overall, therefore, it would appear that the afferents
of the lateral OFC and PF are relatively distinct, despite
the apparent similarity of these structures concerning their
cognitive/behavioral function regarding goal-directed choices.
In our view, the information regarding motor responses that
are conveyed to PF could be the missing puzzle piece that, in
addition to the sensory, emotional, and memory-based inputs
received by lateral OFC, is necessary for the formation of a
single, cohesive state representation. This can be illustrated using
the example of the goal-directed reversal learning procedure
outlined above. As mentioned, we (Bradfield and Balleine,
2017) have previously demonstrated that animals who have
undergone reversal learning simultaneously retain both sets of
competing contingencies, for example, State 1: left lever-pellets,
right lever sucrose; State 2: left lever-sucrose, right lever pellets
(see Figure 2). To effectively form and distinguish between these
state representations in the absence of any change in context or
stimuli, it seems that motor information about which action is
being/has been performed would be crucial to link it with which
outcome is ultimately earned. For example, if on one day after
placement in the operant chamber the animal presses the left
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lever and earns pellets, for example, it might infer state 1, whereas
on another day it might press the left lever and earn sucrose, thus
inferring state 2. Such motor information about which lever is
pressed appears to be readily available via multiple inputs to the
PF but is not available to lateral OFC.
If our assertion here is correct, it assumes that the lateral
OFC and PF both integrate disparate information which is then
further integrated to form a single, internal state representation
to influence action selection. How this could work in a
practical sense is illustrated by the following example: when
the animal is initially placed into the operant chamber, any
state inference that it makes initially would be based on the
integration of their current sensory inputs (telling them they
are in the operant chamber) combined with their memory
of what happened in the operant chamber the day before
(e.g., yesterday State 1 was active so infer State 1 will be
active again today). Based on the afferents outlined above,
this initial inference is most likely to rely on lateral OFC.
However, it is only when the left lever is actually pressed and
pellets are delivered to the food receptacle that the animal can
confirm that State 1 and not State 2 is currently active, and
this inference more likely relies on PF that receives feedback
about the motor action performed. In a broader sense, we,
therefore, suggest that whereas the lateral OFC might form
integrated representations about the sights and smells of the
environment with memories about what contingencies were
previously active here andwhat outcome(s) is currently desirable,
whereas the PF might form and infer integrated representations
of current sensory circumstances with motor response-outcome
information. One straightforward way in which to test whether
this is the case would be to demonstrate that performance in
a task that does not require prior motor response-outcome
history for state representation formation does not rely on PF.
An example of such a task would be sensory preconditioning,
which involves the learning of ‘‘value-free’’ stimulus-stimulus
associations and has been shown to relate to neuronal activity in
the lateral OFC (Sadacca et al., 2018), consistent with lateral OFC
forming state representations based on memories, emotions,
and external information in the absence of motor history
information.
If the OFC and PF do function in the manner described here,
one final question is whether they each form their own, unique
but partial state representations which individually influence
striatal CINs, or whether they contribute unique information
to a single state representation which either influences CINs or
is formed by the striatal CINs themselves. What is clear from
the inactivation studies outlined above, and suggested by the
afferents of each structure, is that both the PF and lateral OFC
do form some kind of integrated representation rather than just
representing individual elements of state representation. If either
structure did the latter (e.g., impaired motor learning generally)
we would expect their inactivation to produce broader behavioral
deficits in learning and performance, not the specific deficits that
were only observed once contingencies were altered.
There is a direct projection from PF to lateral OFC (Reep
et al., 1996; Hoover and Vertes, 2011) suggesting a potential
anatomical basis for these structures to communicate to form
a cohesive representation of the internal state. This is not a
particularly dense pathway, however, and there is no evidence
of any reciprocal projections from OFC→PF, suggesting that
any communication between themmust be unidirectional. Thus,
if a cohesive state representation were formed via this pathway
alone, then the PF could only influence striatum indirectly
via lateral OFC→striatal outputs. Given the density of the
direct pathway from PF→dorsomedial striatum, this seems
unlikely. An alternate possibility is that OFC inputs containing a
unique sensory/emotion/memory representation, and PF inputs
containing a unique sensory/motor representation, converge on
the same striatal CINs, which then combine postsynaptically to
form a cohesive state representation. This possibility is more
consistent with our prior notion that internal state information
is formed postsynaptically by CINs (Bradfield et al., 2013a). A
final possibility is that both of these things occur: the PF projects
to both OFC and striatal CINs and OFC also projects to striatal
CINs, to achieve accurate goal-directed selection according to the
currently inferred state.
Conclusion and Potential Implications
In summary, behavioral evidence from local inactivation studies
suggests that there are certain parallels between the function
of the lateral OFC and PF with regards to the modulation of
goal-directed actions involving choice. Specifically, the patterns
of results yielded from these studies are suggestive of each
structure forming some kind of internal state representation
that is then used to guide goal-directed actions (although this
role for lateral OFC may also extend to ‘‘model-free’’ habitual
actions: see Wilson et al., 2014). Here, we have briefly reviewed
these parallels, before discussing anatomical evidence that may
be suggestive of how the OFC and PF could complement each
other in achieving this function. As these observations are purely
speculative at this stage, it will be of interest to determine whether
they are borne out by future studies.
If correct, and translatable between species, this function of
PF/OFC/CINs could be of great importance. There is already
some suggestion that these functions do translate, based on
several lines of evidence suggesting that OFC (Fellows, 2003;
Valentin et al., 2007; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Wallis,
2012), PF (Bell et al., 2018a), and striatal CINs (Bell et al.,
2018b, 2019) play similar roles in regulating behavioral flexibility
in humans to that which has been identified in rodents. In
the vastly more rich and complex world that is inhabited
by people relative to laboratory rodents, one could imagine
that the ability to infer internal states accurately to exercise
the appropriate action to each situation could be central to
effective functioning. Every time one drives a different car,
for example, they would have to infer the slight differences
in how hard to press the accelerator or brakes, or whether
they are driving manual or automatic and thus need to change
gears, all whilst paying attention to the road. If this ability
is lost, as it potentially is in Parkinson’s disease patients
who experience not only a loss of dopaminergic inputs to
striatum but also a loss of thalamic inputs to striatal CINs
(Smith et al., 2014, 2016), it could deeply impair the ability of
individuals to flexibly switch between actions as each situation
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dictates. This is potentially the neurobiological mechanism that
underlies ‘‘cognitive rigidity’’ that is typical of individuals with
Parkinson’s disease dementia (Kehagia et al., 2010; Smith et al.,
2016).
Despite some functional similarities across species, however,
there is some anatomical evidence to suggest that the nature
of PF projections to striatum and cortex does differ somewhat
between rodents and primates. Specifically, it has been noted that,
in rats, it is the same PF neurons that project directly to the
striatum that also project to cortical regions (Deschênes et al.,
1996), but this was found not to be the case in primates, where
striatal-projecting neurons and cortical-projection neurons in
PF appear to be separate (Parent and Parent, 2005). Thus,
although there is evidence of some parallels across species
with regards to the function of the PF and OFC inputs onto
CINs within the striatum, there are also likely differences in
how this manifests across species. Again, future studies are
necessary to determine how much anatomical, functional, and
cytoarchitectural homology there is between these structures and
circuits in rodents, primates, and humans, and how applicable
these findings could be to individuals with various conditions
affecting them such as Parkinson’s disease dementia.
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